Determinism in its simplest form is the claim that human beings cannot possibly have free-will in any meaningful sense because ultimately a human being is a physical organism whose actions can only be the result of the operation of natural physical laws on physical matter. Under such a model, the notion of free-will does not seem to make sense. The suggestion that we are not free but are just acting out chains of physical causation over which we have no control has a powerful pull on the modern mind, and to some, such as Galen Strawson, it is so persuasive that it can even be demonstrated to be true a priori.
Consequently, the debate about free-will frequently takes the form of finding imaginative ways to make room for free-will in the face of the apparently overwhelming force of the determinist claim that all physical events can be explained in purely causal terms. In this talk, however, Greg Artus wishes to challenge the alleged obviousness of the determinist’s position and show that if one looks in detail at determinism, it is far from obvious that it is even coherent, let alone correct, and often relies on a fair amount of argumentative sleight-of-hand by its proponents. He will argue that when examined clearly, not only is determinism internally contradictory, but it cannot explain the empirical evidence without appealing to notions far more fanciful than free-will.
This seminar will take place both live at CLCC and online. Register and select your mode of attendance using the link below.
