Javier Suarez
Javier Suarez is Professor of Finance at CEMFI, Madrid. He is also Research Fellow of the CEPR and Research Associate of the ECGI. He earned a PhD in Economics at Universidad Carlos III, Madrid. After a postdoctoral stay in Harvard University, he became a lecturer at the London School of Economics. He joined CEMFI in 1996, where he became a tenured Associate Professor in 2001 and a Full Professor in 2004. His research and teaching activities cover mainly the areas of corporate finance and banking, with a special focus on the analysis of bank regulation, venture capital, and the linkages between macroeconomics and finance. He has published in top economics and finance journals, including Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Finance, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Monetary Economics, and Review of Financial Studies. He has served as an associate editor of the Review of Finance and the Journal of the European Economic Association.
During the recent financial crisis, he participated in numerous initiatives bringing together academics and policy makers for the discussion of key challenges regarding banks, their regulation, and the wider implications for the economy. In 2011 he was a Swiss Finance Institute Visiting Professor at the University of Zurich and a visiting scholar at the New York Fed. Since 2013 he serves as an academic advisor to the Macro-prudential Research Network (MaRs) of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).
His current research portfolio focuses on the analytical foundations and the welfare analysis of capital regulation, liquidity risk regulation, and macro-prudential policies.
Abstract: How Excessive Is Banks’ Maturity Transformation? We develop an infinite horizon model in which banks finance long term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt taking into account investors’ preference for short maturities and the risk of systemic crises. Pecuniary externalities in the market for funds during crises make unregulated debt maturities inefficiently short. We calibrate the model to Eurozone banking data for 2006 and assess the size of the inefficiencies and the potential welfare gains from optimally regulating bank debt maturities. We also assess the gains from introducing a liquidity insurance scheme and its complementarity with liquidity regulation.
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The full seminar list can be found on the Finance Group seminar web page