Professor Marco Pagano
Bio sketch:
Marco Pagano is Professor of Economics at University of Naples Federico II, President of the Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) and Research Fellow of the Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) and the European Economic Association (EEA). He holds a B.A. from Cambridge University (1981) and a Ph.D. in Economics from MIT (1986), and taught at Bocconi University and the University of Salerno.
Together with Josef Zechner, since 2003 he is managing editor of the Review of Finance, the journal of the European Finance Association. In 1997 he was awarded the BACOB European Prize for Economic and Financial Research, jointly with Ailsa Röell. From 1997 to 2005 he was a Co-Director of the Research Programme in Financial Economics of the Centre for Economic Policy Research. In 2009 he was Research Fellow of the Italian Academy for Advanced Studies in America and Associate Research Scholar in the Faculty of Business, Columbia University. He chairs the Scientific Committee of MTS, advised the Italian Treasury on the reform of security markets (1995-96), and was a member of the Treasury’s privatisation committee (1997-2001) and of the EU Parliament advisory panel on financial services (2002-04).
Most of his research is in the area of financial economics, especially in the fields of market microstructure, banking and corporate finance. He has also done research in macroeconomics, especially on its interactions with financial markets. His publications have appeared in several journals, such as American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Finance, Review of Financial Studies, RAND Journal of Economics, Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Review, and Economic Journal.
Abstract:
We present a model in which issuers of asset backed securities choose to release coarse information to enhance the liquidity of their primary market, at the cost of reducing secondary market liquidity or even causing it to freeze. The degree of transparency is inefficiently low if the social value of secondary market liquidity exceeds its private value. We analyze various types of public intervention – mandatory transparency standards, provision of liquidity to distressed banks or secondary market price support – and find that they have quite different welfare implications.
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The full seminar list can be found on the Finance Group seminar web page