## Bayesian Model Comparison

## ICIC

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## Frequentist hypothesis testing

- Warning: frequentist hypothesis testing (e.g., likelihood ratio test) cannot be interpreted as a statement about the probability of the hypothesis!
- Example: to test the null hypothesis $\mathrm{H}_{0}: \theta=0$, draw $n$ normally distributed points (with known variance $\sigma^{2}$ ). The $x^{2}$ is distributed as a chi-square distribution with ( $n-1$ ) degrees of freedom (dof). Pick a significance level $a$ (or $p$-value, e.g. $a=0.05$ ). If $P\left(x^{2}\right.$ $>X^{2}$ obs) < a reject the null hypothesis.
- This is a statement about the likelihood of observing data as extreme or more extreme than have been measured assuming the null hypothesis is correct.
- It is not a statement about the probability of the null hypothesis itself and cannot be interpreted as such! (or you'll make gross mistakes)
- The use of p-values implies that a hypothesis that may be true can be rejected because it has not predicted observable results that have not actually occurred. (Jeffreys, 1961)


## The significance of significance

- Important: A 2-sigma result does not wrongly reject the null hypothesis $5 \%$ of the time: at least 29\% of 2-sigma results are wrong!
- Take an equal mixture of $\mathrm{H}_{0}, \mathrm{H}_{1}$
- Simulate data, perform hypothesis testing for $\mathrm{H}_{0}$
- Select results rejecting $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ at (or within a small range from) 1-a CL (this is the prescription by Fisher)
- What fraction of those results did actually come from $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ ("true nulls", should not have been rejected)?

| p -value | sigma | fraction of true nulls | lower bound |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 0.05 | 1.96 | 0.51 | 0.29 |
| 0.01 | 2.58 | 0.20 | 0.11 |
| 0.001 | 3.29 | 0.024 | 0.018 |

Recommended reading:
Sellke, Bayarri \& Berger, The American Statistician, 55, 1 (2001)

## Bayesian methods on the rise

The rise of Bayesian methods in astrophysics


## Bayes' theorem

$$
P(\theta \mid d, I)=\frac{P(d \mid \theta, I) P(\theta \mid I)}{P(d \mid I)}
$$

Ө: parameters
d: data
l: any other external information, or the assumed model

For parameter inference it is sufficient to consider
$P(\theta \mid d, I) \propto P(d \mid \theta, I) P(\theta \mid I)$ posterior $\propto$ likelihood $\times$ prior

## Bayesian model comparison

## Bayesian inference chain

- Select a model (parameters + priors)
- Compute observable quantities as a function of parameters
- Compare with available data
- derive parameters constraints: PARAMETER INFERENCE
- compute relative model probability: MODEL COMPARISON
- Go back and start again

LEVEL 1
I have selected a model M and prior $\mathrm{P}(\theta \mid \mathrm{M})$

$P(\theta \mid d, M)=\frac{P(d \mid \theta, M) P(\theta \mid M)}{P(d \mid M)}$
Parameter inference (assumes M is the true model)

## LEVEL 2

Actually, there are several possible models: $M_{0}, M_{1}, \ldots$

## LEVEL 3

None of the models is clearly the best

$P(\theta \mid d)=\sum_{i} P\left(M_{i} \mid d\right) P\left(\theta \mid d, M_{i}\right)$

Model comparison
What is the relative plausibility of $\mathrm{M}_{0}, \mathrm{M}_{1}, \ldots$ in light of the data?

## Model averaging

What is the inference on
the parameters
accounting for model uncertainty?

$$
P(\theta \mid d, M)=\frac{P(d \mid \theta, M) P(\theta \mid M)}{P(d \mid M)}
$$

The evidence is the integral of the likelihood over the prior:

$$
P(d \mid M)=\int_{\Omega} d \theta P(d \mid \theta, M) P(\theta \mid M)
$$

Bayes' Theorem delivers the model's posterior:

$$
P(M \mid d)=\frac{P(d \mid M) P(M)}{P(d)}
$$

When we are comparing two models:
The Bayes factor:

$$
\frac{P\left(M_{0} \mid d\right)}{P\left(M_{1} \mid d\right)}=\frac{P\left(d \mid M_{0}\right)}{P\left(d \mid M_{1}\right)} \frac{P\left(M_{0}\right)}{P\left(M_{1}\right)} \quad B_{01} \equiv \frac{P\left(d \mid M_{0}\right)}{P\left(d \mid M_{1}\right)}
$$

## Scale for the strength of evidence

- A (slightly modified) Jeffreys' scale to assess the strength of evidence (Notice: this is empirically calibrated!)

| $\|\operatorname{lnB}\|$ | relative odds | favoured model's <br> probability | Interpretation |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $<1.0$ | $<3: 1$ | $<0.750$ | not worth <br> mentioning |
| $<2.5$ | $<12: 1$ | 0.923 | weak |
| $<5.0$ | $<150: 1$ | 0.993 | moderate |
| $>5.0$ | $>150: 1$ | $>0.993$ | strong |

- Bayes factor balances quality of fit vs extra model complexity.
- It rewards highly predictive models, penalizing "wasted" parameter space


The evidence as predictive probability

- The evidence can be understood as a function of $d$ to give the predictive probability under the model M :



## Simple example: nested models

- This happens often in practice: we have a more complex model, $\mathrm{M}_{1}$ with prior $\mathrm{P}\left(\theta \mid \mathrm{M}_{1}\right)$, which reduces to a simpler model ( $\mathrm{M}_{0}$ ) for a certain value of the parameter, e.g. $\theta=\theta^{*}=0$ (nested models)
- Is the extra complexity of $\mathrm{M}_{1}$ warranted by the data?



## Simple example: nested models

Define: $\quad \lambda \equiv \frac{\hat{\theta}-\theta^{*}}{\delta \theta}$
For "informative" data:

wasted parameter
space
(favours simpler model)


## Question 1

- You use Bayesian model comparison to compare:

Model 0 : The coin is fair
Model 1: The coin is biased, with uniform prior between $[0,1]$ for the probability of heads

- Data: 5 heads out of 10 tosses.
- The Bayes factor will:
A. Favour model 0
B. Favour model 1
C. Favour neither model


## Question 2

- You use Bayesian model comparison to compare:

Model 0: The coin is fair
Model 1: The coin has two heads

- Data: 9 heads out of 10 tosses.
- The Bayes factor will:
A. Favour model 0
B. Favour model 1
C. Favour neither model


## Question 3

- You use Bayesian model comparison to compare:

Model 0 : The coin is fair
Model 1: The coin is fair, and the height $h$ of the Shard is 326 m , with a uniform prior for $h$ in $[0,1000] \mathrm{m}$.

- Data: 5 heads out of 10 tosses.
- The Bayes factor will:
A. Favour model 0
B. Favour model 1
C. Favour neither model


## The rough guide to model comparison

$$
I_{10} \equiv \log _{10} \frac{\Delta \theta}{\delta \theta}
$$

## Information criteria

- Several information criteria exist for approximate model comparison $\mathrm{k}=$ number of fitted parameters $\mathrm{N}=$ number of data points, $-2 \ln \left(L_{\text {max }}\right)=$ best-fit chi-squared
- Akaike Information Criterium (AIC):

$$
\mathrm{AIC} \equiv-2 \ln \mathcal{L}_{\max }+2 k
$$

- Bayesian Information Criterium (BIC): $\quad \mathrm{BIC} \equiv-2 \ln \mathcal{L}_{\max }+k \ln N$
- Deviance Information Criterium (DIC): $\quad \mathrm{DIC} \equiv-2 \widehat{D_{\mathrm{KL}}}+2 \mathcal{C}_{b}$.


## Notes on information criteria

- The best model is the one which minimizes the AIC/BIC/DIC
- Warning: AIC and BIC penalize models differently as a function of the number of data points N .
For $\mathrm{N}>7$ BIC has a more strong penalty for models with a larger number of free parameters k.
- BIC is an approximation to the full Bayesian evidence with a default Gaussian prior equivalent to $1 / \mathrm{N}$-th of the data in the large N limit.
- DIC takes into account whether parameters are measured or not (via the Bayesian complexity, see later).
- When possible, computation of the Bayesian evidence is preferable (with explicit prior specification).


## Computing the evidence

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text { evidence: } & P(d \mid M)=\int_{\Omega} d \theta P(d \mid \theta, M) P(\theta \mid M) \\
\text { Bayes factor: } & B_{01} \equiv \frac{P\left(d \mid M_{0}\right)}{P\left(d \mid M_{1}\right)}
\end{aligned}
$$

- Usually computational demanding: multi-dimensional integral!
- Several techniques available:
- Brute force: thermodynamic integration
- Laplace approximation: approximate the likelihood to second order around maximum gives Gaussian integrals (for normal prior). Can be inaccurate.
- Savage-Dickey density ratio: good for nested models, gives the Bayes factor
- Nested sampling: clever \& efficient, can be used generally


## The Savage-Dickey density ratio

- This methods works for nested models and gives the Bayes factor analytically.
- Assumptions: nested models ( $\mathrm{M}_{1}$ with parameters $\theta, \Psi$ reduces to $\mathrm{M}_{0}$ for e.g. $\Psi=0$ ) and separable priors (i.e. the prior $\mathrm{P}\left(\theta, \Psi \mid \mathrm{M}_{1}\right)$ is uncorrelated with $\mathrm{P}\left(\theta \mid \mathrm{M}_{0}\right)$ )
- Result:
- Advantages:
- analytical

$$
B_{01}=\frac{P\left(\Psi=0 \mid d, M_{1}\right)}{P\left(\Psi=0 \mid M_{1}\right)}
$$

Marginal posterior under $\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{1}}$

- often accurate
- clarifies the role of prior
- does not rely on Gaussianity
$\psi=0$


## "Prior-free" evidence bounds

- What if we do not know how to set the prior? For nested models, we can still choose a prior that will maximise the support for the more complex model:



## Maximum evidence for a detection

- The absolute upper bound: put all prior mass for the alternative onto the observed maximum likelihood value. Then

$$
B<\exp \left(-\chi^{2} / 2\right)
$$

- More reasonable class of priors: symmetric and unimodal around $\Psi=0$, then ( $\alpha=$ significance level)

$$
B<\frac{-1}{\exp (1) \alpha \ln \alpha}
$$

If the upper bound is small, no other choice of prior will make the extra parameter significant.

Sellke, Bayarri \& Berger, The American Statistician, 55, 1 (2001)

How to interpret the "number of sigma's" $\begin{aligned} & \text { Imperial College } \\ & \text { Londor }\end{aligned}$

| a sigma | Absolute bound <br> on InB (B) | "Reasonable" <br> bound on InB <br> (B) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0.05 | 2.0 | 2.0 <br> $(7: 1)$ <br> weak | 0.9 <br> $(3: 1)$ <br> undecided |
| 0.003 | 3.0 | 4.5 <br> $(90: 1)$ <br> moderate | 3.0 <br> $(21: 1)$ <br> moderate |
| 0.0003 | 3.6 | 6.48 <br> $(650: 1)$ <br> strong | 5.0 <br> $(150: 1)$ <br> strong |

## A conversion table

| p-value | $\bar{B}$ | $\ln \bar{B}$ | sigma | category |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | :--- |
| 0.05 | 2.5 | 0.9 | 2.0 |  |
| 0.04 | 2.9 | 1.0 | 2.1 | 'weak' at best |
| 0.01 | 8.0 | 2.1 | 2.6 |  |
| 0.006 | 12 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 'moderate' at best |
| 0.003 | 21 | 3.0 | 3.0 |  |
| 0.001 | 53 | 4.0 | 3.3 |  |
| 0.0003 | 150 | 5.0 | 3.6 | 'strong' at best |
| $6 \times 10^{-7}$ | 43000 | 11 | 5.0 |  |

Rule of thumb:
a n-sigma result should be interpreted as a n-1 sigma result
$\qquad$

- Perhaps the method to compute the evidence
- At the same time, it delivers samples from the posterior: it is a highly efficient sampler! (much better than MCMC in tricky situations)
- Invented by John Skilling in 2005: the gist is to convert a $n$-dimensional integral in a 1D integral that can be done easily.


Liddle et al (2006)


(animation courtesy of David Parkinson)
An algorithm originally aimed primarily at the Bayesian evidence computation (Skilling, 2006):

## The MultiNest algorithm

- Feroz \& Hobson (2007)

Target


## Reconstructed



## The egg-box example

- MultiNest reconstruction of the egg-box posterior:



## Ellipsoidal decomposition

Unimodal distribution Multimodal distribution


ICI $\bar{C}$
Courtesy Mike Hobson

## Multinest: Efficiency

Gaussian mixture model:


True evidence: $\log (E)=-5.27$
Multinest:
Reconstruction: $\log (E)=-5.33 \pm 0.11$
Likelihood evaluations ~ $10^{4}$

## Thermodynamic integration:

Reconstruction: $\log (E)=-5.24 \pm 0.12$
Likelihood evaluations ~ $10^{6}$

Peak 1
Peak2


| $D$ | Nlike | efficiency | likes per <br> dimension |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | 7000 | $70 \%$ | 83 |
| 5 | 18000 | $51 \%$ | 7 |
| 10 | 53000 | $34 \%$ | 3 |
| 20 | 255000 | $15 \%$ | 1.8 |
| 30 | 753000 | $8 \%$ | 1.6 |

## Application: the spatial curvature

- Is the Universe spatially flat? (Vardanyan, Trotta and Silk, 2009)
- A three-way model comparison:
$\Omega_{\mathrm{k}}=0$ vs $\Omega_{\mathrm{k}}<0$ vs $\Omega_{\mathrm{k}}>0$
(with either the Astronomer's prior or Curvature scale prior)
- Result: odds range from moderate evidence $(\operatorname{lnB}=4)$ for flatness to undecided $(\operatorname{lnB}=0.4)$ depending on the choice of prior
- Probability(infinite Universe) $=98 \%$ (Astronomer's prior)
Probability(infinite Universe) $=45 \%$
(Curvature scale prior)
- Upper bound: odds of 49:1 at best for $n \neq 1$ (Gordon and Trotta 2007)

A "simple" example: how many sources?
Feroz and Hobson (2007)

## Signal + Noise



A "simple" example: how many sources?

Feroz and Hobson (2007)

## Signal: 8 sources



A "simple" example: how many sources?

Feroz and Hobson (2007)


## Bayesian reconstruction

7 out of 8 objects correctly identified. Mistake happens because 2 objects very close.


## Cluster detection from Sunyaev-Zeldovich effect in cosmic microwave background maps



Feroz et al 2009


## Bayesian model comparison:

R = P(cluster | data)/P(no cluster | data)

$$
R=0.35 \pm 0.05 \quad R \sim 10^{33}
$$

Cluster parameters also recovered (position, temperature, profile, etc)

## The cosmological concordance model



InB < 0: favours ^CDM

## Model complexity

- "Number of free parameters" is a relative concept. The relevant scale is set by the prior range
- How many parameters can the data support, regardless of whether their detection is significant?
- Bayesian complexity or effective number of parameters:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{C}_{b} & =\overline{\chi^{2}(\theta)}-\chi^{2}(\widehat{\theta}) \\
& =\sum_{i} \frac{1}{1+\left(\sigma_{i} / \Sigma_{i}\right)^{2}}
\end{aligned}
$$

Kunz, RT \& Parkinson, astro-ph/0602378, Phys. Rev. D 74, 023503 (2006)
Following Spiegelhalter et al (2002)

- Data generated from a model with $\mathrm{n}=6$ :

GOOD DATA
Max supported complexity ~9

INSUFFICIENT DATA
Max supported complexity $\sim 4$ need?


$$
P(\theta \mid d)=\sum_{i} P\left(\theta \mid d, M_{i}\right) P\left(M_{i} \mid d\right)
$$

An application to dark energy:
 Liddle et al (2007)


Model IV


Model V


Model averaged inferences


- Bayesian model comparison extends parameter inference to the space of models
- The Bayesian evidence (model likelihood) represents the change in the degree of belief in the model after we have seen the data
- Models are rewarded for their predictivity (automatic Occam's razor)
- Prior specification is for model comparison a key ingredient of the model building step. If the prior cannot be meaningfully set, then the physics in the model is probably not good enough.
- Bayesian model complexity can help (together with the Bayesian evidence) in assessing model performance.

