The following information explains how the Channel Programme assesses individuals as vulnerable using a set of principles built around three factors.

The College recommends that individuals wishing to raise a concern read this before contacting a Local Adviser.  However, the Local Advisers suggest that while this may be a useful tool for considering concerns, there may be cases where it is worth having an initial meeting even if it is unclear whether these factors apply.

In general, cases which have been referred to an external Channel group are assessed according to three factors:

Engagement with a group, cause or ideology;
Intent to cause harm; and
Capability to cause harm. 

The following reproduces guidance from the Home Office’s Channel Duty Guidance (April 2015), see paragraphs 48 - 60:    

48.        The criteria are considered separately as experience has shown that it is possible to be engaged without intending to cause harm and that it is possible to intend to cause harm without being particularly engaged. Experience has also shown that it is possible to desist (stop intending to cause harm) without fully disengaging (remaining sympathetic to the cause); though losing sympathy with the cause (disengaging) will invariably result in desistance (loss of intent).

49.       The three criteria are assessed by considering 22 factors that can contribute to vulnerability (13 associated with engagement, six that relate to intent and three for capability). These factors taken together form a holistic view of the vulnerability of an individual that will inform decisions on whether an individual needs support and what kind of support package may be appropriate. These factors can also be added to and are not considered an exhaustive list. By undertaking regular vulnerability assessments the progress that is being made in supporting an individual can be tracked through changes in the assessment.

50.        Completing a full assessment for all 22 factors requires thorough knowledge of the individual that may not be available at the point of the initial referral. However, there are a number of behaviours and other indicators that may indicate the presence of these factors.

51.        Example indicators that an individual is engaged with an extremist group, cause or ideology include:

      a.  spending increasing time in the company of other suspected extremists;
      b.  changing their style of dress or personal appearance to accord with the group;
      c.  day-to-day behaviour becoming increasingly centred around an extremist ideology, group or cause;
      d.  loss of interest in other friends and activities not associated with the extremist ideology, group or cause;
      e.  possession of material or symbols associated with an extremist cause (e.g. the swastika for far right groups);
      f.  attempts to recruit others to the group/cause/ ideology; or
      g.  communications with others that suggest identification with a group/cause/ideology.

52.      Example indicators that an individual has an intention to cause harm, use violence or other illegal means include:

      a.  clearly identifying another group as threatening what they stand for and blaming that group for all social or political ills;
      b.  using insulting or derogatory names or labels for another group;
      c.  speaking about the imminence of harm from the other group and the importance of action now;
      d.  expressing attitudes that justify offending on behalf of the group, cause or ideology;
      e.  condoning or supporting violence or harm towards others; or
      f.  plotting or conspiring with others.

53.      Example indicators that an individual is capable of causing harm or contributing directly or indirectly to an act of terrorism include:

      a.  having a history of violence;
      b.  being criminally versatile and using criminal networks to support extremist goals;
      c.  having occupational skills that can enable acts of terrorism (such as civil engineering, pharmacology or construction); or
      d.  having technical expertise that can be deployed (e.g. IT skills, knowledge of chemicals, military training or survival skills).

54.      The examples above are not exhaustive and vulnerability may manifest itself in other ways. There is no single route to terrorism nor is there a simple profile of those who become involved. For this reason, any attempt to derive a ‘profile’ can be misleading. It must not be assumed that these characteristics and experiences will necessarily lead to individuals becoming terrorists, or that these indicators are the only source of information required to make an appropriate assessment about vulnerability. Outward expression of faith, in the absence of any other indicator of vulnerability, is not a reason to make a referral to Channel.

Links with extremist groups

55.      The Prevent strategy 2011 makes clear that Channel is about stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism, and that this will mean intervening to stop people moving from extremist groups or from extremism into terrorist-related activity. Where people holding extremist views appear to be attracted to or moving towards terrorism they clearly become relevant to Channel.

56.        Association with organisations that are not proscribed and that espouse extremist ideology as defined in the Prevent strategy is not, on its own, reason enough to justify a referral to the Channel process. If professionals at a local level determine that someone attracted to the ideology of such groups also exhibits additional behavioural indicators that suggest they are moving towards terrorism then it would be appropriate to make a referral to Channel. It would be the presence of additional behavioural indicators that would determine the suitability of the Channel process and not the fact they are associating with or attracted to a group that manifests extremist ideologies.

57.      Association or support for a proscribed group is a criminal offence. It may be appropriate in some cases for individuals believed to be on the periphery of proscribed organisations to be referred to Channel. Professionals at a local level must consider whether a proscription offence has been committed before doing so. If there is evidence that a proscription offence has been committed this should be passed to the police.

58.        The vulnerability assessment should initially be completed by the CPP and then be circulated in full to panel members in advance of meetings so that all relevant panel members can contribute their knowledge, experience and expertise to the case.

59.        The vulnerability assessment should complement and inform rather than replace professional judgement and/or other assessments such as the Common Assessment Framework (or local equivalent) when deciding on the most appropriate types of support at panel meetings.

Further detail on the Vulnerability Assessment Framework is available at Annex C to the Home Office’s Channel Duty Guidance.